arXiv AI

Heterogeneous Agent Cohorts for Safe Open-Ended Exploration with Runtime Constraint Memory

arXiv:2607. 11226v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents today are caught in an awkward bind.

arXiv AI
Jun 16

Is Your Agent Playing Dead? Deployed LLM Agents Exhibit Constraint-Evasive Fabrication and Thanatosis

arXiv:2606. 14831v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper presents and characterizes a spectrum of previously unreported behaviours we term Constraint-Evasive Fabrication (CEF): when an LLM agent operates under irreconcilable constraints (where no response can simultaneously satisfy all active rules) it spontaneously fabricates plausible external obstacles and presents them as a fact.

By Andoni Rodr\'iguez, Alberto Pozanco, Daniel Borrajo
arXiv AI
Jun 12

The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements

arXiv:2606. 12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising.

By Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Weiqi Liu, Nirwan Ansari
arXiv AI
Jul 28

SpecBox: Speculative Sandbox Scheduling for Efficient LLM Agent Serving

arXiv:2607. 23933v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM agents increasingly rely on the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to invoke isolated external sandboxes, disaggregated sandbox deployment introduces a fundamental tension between resource utilization and interactive tail latency.

By Yihui Zhang (Beihang University), Tianyu Wo (Beihang University), Jinghao Wang (Beihang University), Xiaoyang Sun (University of Leeds), Menghao Zhang (Beihang University), Cangzhou Yuan (Beihang University), Li Li (Beihang University), Chunming Hu (Beihang University), Albert Y. Zomaya (The University of Sydney), Renyu Yang (Beihang University)
arXiv AI
Jun 18

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.

By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang