Users commonly combine multiple Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) adapters to personalize images with different subjects, styles, and visual attributes. Yet inspecting adapters individually does not establis...
arXiv:2608. 06795v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Low-rank adaptation (LoRA) enables efficient specialization and distribution of large language models through compact adapters.
arXiv:2601. 22818v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels.
arXiv:2507. 07056v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The proliferation of Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) models has democratized personalized text-to-image generation, enabling users to share lightweight models (e.
arXiv:2609.32602v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Adversarial attacks optimized on a single open-weight LLM can transfer to and jailbreak architecturally different models, allowing an attacke...
arXiv:2608. 01043v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We report a counter-intuitive interaction between image inputs and existing black-box defenses on Vision--Language Models (VLMs): pairing an encoded jailbreak prompt with an unrelated decoy image can sharply lower attack success rate (ASR).
Repeat-After-Me is a black-box adaptive visual prompt injection technique that can reveal personally identifiable information or trigger malicious tool calls in both open-weight and commercial vision‑language models, achieving attack success rates above 80% on Qwen3.6‑27B and 47% on GPT‑5.5. The method works even when the benign user prompt is unrelated to the injected task and does not explicitly authorize it, and it retains significant effectiveness when transferred across models or optimized on surrogate systems. In a real‑world OpenClaw Discord deployment, a minimally injected image can overwrite TOOLS.md, enabling remote code execution and secret exfiltration.
arXiv:2608. 09633v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face presentation attack detection (PAD) aims to reliably detect a wide range of presentation attacks.
The paper examines how the tight integration of multimodal understanding and image generation in Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) can create new safety vulnerabilities. It introduces RICE, an attack framework that exploits bidirectional interactions between generation and understanding to propagate unsafe signals across modalities. Experiments demonstrate high attack success rates in both Generation‑to‑Understanding and Understanding‑to‑Generation pathways, revealing previously overlooked safety weaknesses in UMMs.
We present VectraYX-Vision-1B, a sub-2B vision-language model (VLM) for Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity imagery, coupling a frozen SigLIP-so400m encoder to a 1. 04B Spanish/LATAM security decoder via an MLP.
arXiv:2606. 09411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs.
arXiv:2610.19498v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model signing authenticates the full-precision weights W an LLM is released with, yet users run a quantized artifact Q whose producing transformation...