arXiv:2607. 26574v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap.
By Haoyu Zhang, Zhuoxi Wang, Shibo Zheng, Zijian Xiao, Xiangchen Guan, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita
arXiv:2607. 26574v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet a guard judges an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a classical language, code, or text rendered inside an image slips past a guard that would block it in plain language - the decode gap.
By Haoyu Zhang, Zhuoxi Wang, Shibo Zheng, Yi Feng, Xiao Luo, Zijian Xiao, Haowen Xu, Xiangchen Guan, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita
arXiv:2608. 17067v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As text-to-image generative models advance, they raise critical safety concerns, particularly the generation of Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content such as violence and nudity, further exacerbated by red-teaming adversarial attacks.
By Tong Zhang, Motasem Alfarra, Carlos Hinojosa, Christos Louizos, Bernard Ghanem
Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization.
arXiv:2604. 06247v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt injections delivered through text or images.
By Guy Azov, Ofer Rivlin, Guy Shtar
arXiv:2608. 17234v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly used to interact with screenshots, scanned documents, diagrams, and other visually grounded inputs.
By Md Abdullahil Oaphy, Anhao Xiang, Zongxing Xie, Huayue Gu, Chenyu Wang, Honghui Xu
arXiv:2604. 12616v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) expand the attack surface of safety-aligned systems by coupling visual perception with text generation.
By Jianhao Chen, Haoyang Chen, Hanjie Zhao, Haozhe Liang, Zheng Wang, Tieyun Qian
arXiv:2607. 17779v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images.
By Dongdong Yang, Deyue Zhang, Zhao Liu, Zonghao Ying, Wenzhuo Xu, Jiankai Jin, Xiangzheng Zhang, Quanchen Zou
arXiv:2605. 10764v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent studies show that gradient-based universal image jailbreaks on vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit little or no cross-model transferability, casting doubt on the feasibility of transferable multimodal jailbreaks.
By Mengqi He, Xinyu Tian, Xin Shen, Shu Zou, Jinhong Ni, Zhaoyuan Yang, Weikang Li, Xuesong Li, Jing Zhang
arXiv:2606. 03647v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge.
By Vincent Limbach, Jonas Dornbusch, David L\"udke, Stephan G\"unnemann, Leo Schwinn
arXiv:2607. 26639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate.
By Haoyu Zhang, Shibo Zheng, Xiangchen Guan, Zhuoxi Wang, Zijian Xiao, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita
A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate. We show it can be breached by composing two attacks that are individually harmless against it: an established code-completion encoding and an established best-of-N search, neither of which exceeds 4.