arXiv AI

S-GAP: Stealthy Graph Attack Primitives for Graph Large Language Models

The paper introduces S‑GAP, a stealthy graph attack primitive that unifies textual and structural perturbations into a single coherent attack intent for Graph Large Language Models (GraphLLMs). By iteratively refining the semantic content of the GAP through a multi‑agent framework, S‑GAP achieves higher attack success rates and produces more relationally plausible perturbations compared to existing methods. Experiments on four datasets and three GraphLLMs demonstrate an average 7.02% improvement in attack success rate, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current GraphLLMs.

arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 24

Trojaning the Alignment: Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against Graph Foundation Models

The paper introduces STAG, a stealthy trojan attack framework targeting Graph Foundation Models (GFMs) that operate on text‑attributed graphs (TAGs). STAG jointly generates graph triggers and soft‑prompt text cues so that both modalities converge to a malicious target class while keeping the trigger subgraph structurally similar to the original and the trigger text readable. Experiments on several TAG datasets and GFMs confirm that STAG achieves high attack success rates while remaining difficult to detect.

By Minhua Lin, Zhicheng Gao, Yilong Wang, Hanqing Lu, Xiang Zhang, Suhang Wang
arXiv AI
5d ago

FedGraph: Defending Federated Large Language Model Fine-Tuning Against Backdoor Attacks via Graph-Based Aggregation

FedGraph is a graph-based aggregation framework designed to defend federated large language model fine-tuning against backdoor attacks. It exploits the observation that malicious clients produce consistently similar updates, while benign clients generate diverse ones, by modeling client updates as nodes in a dynamically constructed graph and extracting structural features. The resulting compact client representations enable effective identification and suppression of malicious contributions, achieving high detection accuracy and low false positives in extensive experiments.

By Xi Chen, Chunyi Zhou, Rui Zeng, Xiaogang Xu, Zhe Liu, Shouling Ji
arXiv AI
Oct 5

Hop-Decayed Influence: New Vulnerabilities of Structural Auxiliary Indexing in GraphRAG Pipelines with LLM

The paper introduces the Hop-Decayed Influence (HDI) attack, which targets auxiliary schema-level structures—semantic summaries, hierarchical edges, and pre-computed scores—used in GraphRAG pipelines for retrieval prioritisation. By propagating query-aware influence, HDI identifies high-impact targets and corrupts a minuscule fraction (as low as 0.016%) of these structures, achieving an 88–94% success rate across HotpotQA and 2WikiMultiHopQA benchmarks on Microsoft GraphRAG and HippoRAG2 architectures. The modifications affect up to six queries each, yielding a 1:N amplification that instance-level attacks cannot achieve, and they evade perplexity and paraphrase defenses with over 99% evasion, exposing a structural blind spot in current GraphRAG defenses.

By Jisung Park, John Le, Heath Cooper
arXiv Computation and Language
5d ago

GraphRAG-LTM: A Layered Threat Modeling Framework for Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation

GraphRAG-LTM is a Layered Threat Modeling framework designed to evaluate security vulnerabilities in Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG). It introduces three nested attacker access levels—BB Query, WB Query, and Graph-aware WB—that manipulate query ranking, retriever gradients, and graph evidence to degrade answer quality. Experiments across datasets, retrievers, and LLM backbones show that rank feedback alone lowers answer quality, gradient access amplifies query attacks, and deleting bridge triplets further disrupts multi‑hop evidence propagation.

By Yining Tang, Junyu Zhang, Haomiao Qiu, Yongchao Liu, Jiajun Zheng, Zhao Wang, Ziyue Qiao, Chao Wu
arXiv AI
Oct 12

Cancerous Backdoor Attack: Gradual Activation via Invisible Tokens and A Stage Controller

The paper introduces the Cancerous Backdoor Attack, a novel backdoor technique for large language models that activates gradually through multiple hidden stages rather than a single trigger-response. It uses invisible tokens to embed intermediate stages into the model’s reasoning process and a stage controller to monitor the attack’s progression during inference. Experiments on various reasoning datasets show that this method consistently corrupts model outputs over time and outperforms existing backdoor baselines.

By Tahmid Imtiaz Imu, Emama Nahid, Prodipta Sen Amartya, Ahsanul Jobayer, Yutong Song, Jiang Wu, Pengfei Zhang, Honghui Xu