arXiv:2607. 11888v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We develop a rigorous theoretical framework for optimal market making in perpetual futures markets with zero maker fees.
arXiv:2607. 16891v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A truckload carrier must accept or reject each load tender within seconds.
arXiv:2607. 02196v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study online resource allocation when both rewards and consumption sizes may be continuously distributed.
arXiv:2605. 16064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets.
arXiv:2607. 27626v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-critical IoT systems such as industrial closed-loop control, V2X coordination, and remote teleoperation require every sensor's peak Age of Information (peak AoI, also abbreviated PAoI) to stay below a hard per-slot deadline, not merely an average bound.
arXiv:2512. 14991v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study reinforcement learning for controlled diffusion processes with unbounded continuous state spaces, bounded continuous actions, and polynomially growing rewards: settings that arise naturally in finance, economics, and operations research.
arXiv:2606. 17269v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In skill-constrained production-inventory systems, the qualified human capacity available tomorrow depends on training decisions made today: production requires certified workers, certifications decay unless maintained, and training consumes the same scarce worker hours that production needs now.
arXiv:2608. 04832v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Control policies optimized in simulation can perform poorly in the real system when the parameters $x$ of the simulator are estimated from limited data but the resulting parameter uncertainty is not represented inside the simulation.
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
arXiv:2604. 08580v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Reward fine-tuning of diffusion and flow models and sampling from tilted or Boltzmann distributions can both be formulated as stochastic optimal control (SOC) problems, where learning an optimal generative dynamics corresponds to optimizing a control under SDE constraints.
arXiv:2608. 17929v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Robust Markov decision processes optimize one policy against a set of plausible transition functions.
arXiv:2607. 10960v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.