arXiv:2606. 05363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand?
By Yuhang Wu, Assaf Zeevi
arXiv:2601. 01279v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: When competing sellers delegate pricing to a shared AI model, such as a large language model, correlated recommendations combined with performance-driven updates aggregating seller feedback raise a key question: can standard AI deployment practices inadvertently produce supracompetitive pricing?
By Shengyu Cao, Ming Hu
The paper investigates whether pricing algorithms on multi‑seller platforms should incorporate competitors’ prices when learning demand. It compares two strategies: informed sellers that use competitor prices in their learning models, and oblivious sellers that ignore them. The study finds that oblivious sellers must explore prices more aggressively to offset missing competitor information; when all sellers are oblivious, prices eventually converge to the competitive outcome, but insufficient exploration can create many pseudo‑equilibria. In mixed markets, informed sellers earn more, and the unique Nash equilibrium is a fully informed market where prices efficiently converge to the competitive outcome, showing that oblivious modeling does not reliably produce collusion.
By Yuhang Wu, Assaf Zeevi
arXiv:2512. 22749v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents.
By Rui Ai, David Simchi-Levi, Feng Zhu
arXiv:2608. 08268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics.
By Dantong Chu, Xuefeng Gao, Yufei Zhang
arXiv:2609.00710v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: An LLM application often sells or internally allocates several service products: a small or premium model, a short or long token cap, and possibly mu...
By Patrick Wong