arXiv Machine Learning By Sayan Biswas, Antoine Boutet, Davide Frey, Romaric Gaudel, Rachid Guerraoui, Maxime Jacovella, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Dimitri Ler\'ev\'erend, Fran\c{c}ois Ta\"iani, Martijn de Vos

Your Neighbors Know: Leveraging Local Neighborhoods for Backdoor Detection in Decentralized Learning

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arXiv AI
Sep 24

Backdoors Leave Structural Traces: FedMAST for Backdoor Detection and Containment in Federated Learning

The paper introduces FedMAST, a Federated Multi‑Axis Structural Tracing defense designed to detect and contain backdoor attacks in federated learning. FedMAST evaluates client updates through complementary structural, spectral, and historical evidence, applying tiered filtering and round‑level containment. In experiments across six backdoor attacks, FedMAST consistently achieves lower attack success rates while preserving high main‑task accuracy.

By Srinivasan Subramanian, Kazi Aminul Islam, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan
arXiv AI
Oct 15

FedGraph: Defending Federated Large Language Model Fine-Tuning Against Backdoor Attacks via Graph-Based Aggregation

FedGraph is a graph-based aggregation framework designed to defend federated large language model fine-tuning against backdoor attacks. It exploits the observation that malicious clients produce consistently similar updates, while benign clients generate diverse ones, by modeling client updates as nodes in a dynamically constructed graph and extracting structural features. The resulting compact client representations enable effective identification and suppression of malicious contributions, achieving high detection accuracy and low false positives in extensive experiments.

By Xi Chen, Chunyi Zhou, Rui Zeng, Xiaogang Xu, Zhe Liu, Shouling Ji
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 23

FedNIA: Noise-Induced Activation Analysis for Mitigating Data Poisoning in Federated Learning

FedNIA is a defense framework for federated learning that identifies and excludes malicious clients without needing a central test dataset. It works by injecting random noise inputs and analyzing layerwise activation patterns with an autoencoder to detect abnormal behaviors caused by data poisoning. The method can counter various attack types—including sample poisoning, label flipping, and backdoors—even when multiple attackers collaborate, and shows strong performance on non‑iid federated datasets.

By Ehsan Hallaji, Roozbeh Razavi-Far, Mehrdad Saif