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arXiv Computation and Language By Zhaodi Chen, Byungkyu Lee

Whose Judgments Count? Representation Gaps in Crowdsourced Content Moderation Produce Unequal Protection from Perceived Toxicity

Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →

The study investigates how the demographic makeup of crowdsourced moderators influences who is protected from perceived toxic content online. Using data from 16,221 U.S. respondents who evaluated over 100,000 comments from Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan, the authors find that moderators tend to protect users who share their own demographic identities, a pattern that is amplified when moderator pools mirror the demographics of Prolific participants. Even fully representative moderator groups fail to provide equal protection, leaving Black and LGB users underprotected unless they are overrepresented.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Computation and Language.

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