arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.
By Subhadip Mitra
Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering).
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
By Tung-Ling Li, Hongliang Liu, Yuhao Wu
arXiv:2606. 05396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it transforms vulnerable seeds rather than synthesising vulnerabilities from a specification.
By Cristina Carleo, Pietro Liguori, Naghmeh Ivaki, Domenico Cotroneo
arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.
By Jun Wen Leong
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
By Sawyer Zhang, Alexander Wang, Sophie Lei