arXiv AI By Sunday Oyinlola Ogundoyin, Muhammad Ikram

When Agents Talk, Secrets Travel: Topology-Driven Leakage and Recipient-Conditioned Sanitization in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
2d ago

Judging Before Propagation: Task-Graph Contextual Integrity for Multi-Agent Privacy

The paper introduces Task-Graph Contextual Integrity (TG‑CI), a formalism that extends traditional Contextual Integrity to multi‑agent systems by modeling workflows as Multi‑Agent Task Graphs (MATGs). TG‑CI evaluates privacy not just at individual disclosures but across the entire downstream propagation, offering two enforcement policies—Full‑Scope and Auto‑Region—that balance privacy protection with task performance. A new benchmark, MAPLE‑Bench, demonstrates that TG‑CI can cut unauthorized disclosures by up to 94% while preserving over 94% of task accuracy compared to existing local‑history CI methods.

By Hengyu Wu, Blaise Delattre, Yang Cao
arXiv AI
6d ago

InferPriv: Evaluating Inferential Privacy Leakage in LLM Assistants

InferPriv is a new benchmark that evaluates inferential privacy leakage in large language model (LLM) assistants. It measures whether an honest-but-curious recipient can deduce a user’s sensitive attributes from an LLM’s reply during routine tasks, a type of leakage not captured by existing direct‑leakage benchmarks. Testing five frontier models, the study finds that inferential leakage rates (16.2–25.2%) far exceed direct leakage, even when direct leakage is near zero under privacy‑aware prompts.

By Pengrun Huang, Yiwei Fu, Luoxi Meng, Kamalika Chaudhuri