arXiv:2512. 04668v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2606. 25115v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-device language-model agents improve by accumulating experience in retrieved memory rather than by updating weights.
arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.
arXiv:2606. 30602v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used to automate complex, distributed workflows.
arXiv:2602. 11510v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current output-only benchmarks cannot measure.
arXiv:2606. 15903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Where an LLM sits in an agent memory pipeline -- between the recall plane that retrieves stored facts (extensively benchmarked) and the control plane that mutates them via supersede, release, purge (largely untested) -- shapes which forgetting failure modes the system recovers.
arXiv:2608. 08131v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In the fictional Order 66, catastrophe does not arise from a powerful command alone: a trusted population is preconditioned, a short directive activates the concealed condition, and protective authority turns against the system.
arXiv:2606. 30566v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We discover a behavioral invariant in LLM agents under persistent memory poisoning: in architectures where routing information is retrieved through observable memory-tool invocations, successful attacks require calling memory_recall_fact before email_send_email, a transition that non-exfiltrating sessions rarely exhibit.
arXiv:2606. 02822v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM applications stack several defense families -- refusal-phrase filters, token-budget controls, model allowlists, rate limits, tool-registry authentication -- yet existing breach-and-attack-simulation (BAS) benchmarks report a single aggregate coverage number, hiding which family closes which threat.
arXiv:2606. 12703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions.
arXiv:2506. 19260v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning transmits only model updates to protect client data, and differentially private SGD (DP-SGD) bounds content-level leakage through those updates.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.