arXiv Machine Learning By Koutian Wu, Zesen Huang, Hejia Geng

What Git Does Not Record: Provenance Legibility in Two AI-Assisted Research Repositories

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper audits two single‑investigator AI‑assisted research repositories to assess how well they record provenance of AI tool use. One repository contains a prescriptive trace of rule files, with 85.6% of committed lines still visible, while the other holds a narrative trace of an agent’s scratchpad, showing only 21.8% visibility. The study finds that repository‑level indicators such as the Co‑Authored‑By trailer are inconsistent and unreliable for measuring AI involvement, and it outlines which provenance claims each trace type can support or fail to support.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

arXiv AI
Sep 1

CrossAudit: A Git-Native, Cross-Vendor Audit Loop for Agentic Science

CrossAudit proposes a Git‑native, cross‑vendor audit protocol for autonomous research pipelines, ensuring each work increment is reviewed by an agent from a different vendor against a human‑written rulebook. Audit outcomes, disputes, and rulings are stored as git commits, providing a replayable, versioned supervision history. The authors implemented the protocol with GitHub Actions and Python, deployed it in a computational‑chemistry pipeline, and conducted a seeded‑defect trial that revealed differing interpretations of the same rulebook by two vendors.

By Zhaohe Dong, Yuhao Chen
arXiv AI
Oct 2

Actions with Receipts: Jointly Binding Claims, Evidence, and Execution for Replayable Tool-Agent Auditing

The paper introduces a claim‑anchored execution contract that binds a tool‑using agent’s emitted claim to its exact source span, the ordered execution prefix that produced it, and the source version and access state observed. Each receipt contains deterministic anchors, source identifiers, offsets, hashes, quotes, and a domain‑separated execution commitment, allowing a verifier to reconstruct these bindings before semantic or task labels are joined. The contract defines seven independently testable properties and demonstrates high detection rates against cross‑object attacks, with strong performance on conflict‑aware support guard evaluations.

By Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang, Yina Sa, Daren Zha, Jun Xiao
arXiv AI
Sep 3

ClaimReceipt: Verifying Evidence Sufficiency and Coverage in Agent Evaluations

The paper introduces ClaimReceipt, a specification and verifier that checks whether a claim in an agent evaluation can be recomputed from retained evidence (sufficiency) and whether the evidence covers the entire experiment set (coverage). Using the CR‑2 verifier on 1,392 historical records, the authors demonstrate accurate reproduction of audit verdicts, non‑redundant field groups, and zero false positives on semantic faults. In a prospective CR‑3 run, the system correctly flags missing receipts and preserves coverage when private evidence is withheld, while adding minimal overhead to inference time and transaction size.

By Peiying Zhu, Sidi Chang
arXiv AI
3d ago

Agent or Human? Detecting Commits by AI Coding Agents in the Absence of Authorship Signatures

The study examines whether commits made by AI coding agents can be distinguished from human commits when authorship signatures are removed. Using nearly 8 million commits from over a thousand repositories, the authors find that detectors can achieve a ROC AUC of up to 0.859, largely driven by message verbosity and change size rather than code content. However, precision remains low (≈0.332) and detection performance drops on held‑out agents, indicating limited reliability without explicit attribution.

By Kosei Horikawa, Hao Li, Yutaro Kashiwa, Youssef Esseddiq Ouatiti, Mohammed Sayagh, Bram Adams, Hajimu Iida, Ahmed E. Hassan