Walking on the DARKSIDE
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) interpret negation across different logical semantics—open‑world vs. closed‑world, two‑ vs. three‑valued, and credulous vs. skeptical reasoning. Using the newly introduced NAFBench, a procedural generator that creates solver‑certified logic programs and their natural‑language verbalizations, the authors evaluate LLMs on four semantic viewpoints (SLDNF, well‑founded semantics, and stable‑model semantics). Results show a persistent gap: even the strongest models achieve only 59–74% accuracy, with many models sensitive to rule ordering and prone to overcommitment on undefined cases, though some frontier models reach near‑perfect performance on a fixed‑complexity set. "whyItMatters":"The study highlights that current LLMs struggle to reliably follow explicitly specified negation semantics, underscoring a limitation in their logical reasoning capabilities."
The paper introduces the concept of "linguistic illegibility," describing how a large language model’s (LLM) language outputs and extracted linguistic features may not accurately reflect its internal computations. It argues that because LLMs compute primarily in activation spaces, any reliance on linguistic self‑reporting for security—such as chain‑of‑thought monitoring or constitutional self‑critique—cannot be fully reliable. The authors propose taint tracking and other sandboxing techniques that do not depend on the model’s linguistic state as a more robust security foundation.
arXiv:2607. 12650v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool access alone does not make LLM empirical reasoning governable: accepted outputs need not descend from attested evidence, and accepted deductions need not hold up under formal scrutiny.
arXiv:2606. 08539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly take consequential actions -- shell commands, cloud operations, and arbitrary tool-calls -- so a trust layer must decide, per action, whether to allow, warn, block, or escalate.
arXiv:2606. 16603v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in data-intensive analytical tasks, yet their outputs are rarely verifiable: a reliance on linear text trajectories makes their reasoning difficult to audit.
arXiv:2608. 03291v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning improves large language model (LLM) performance while also providing an observable interface to the model's reasoning process.