arXiv:2606. 23768v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose cryptographic certificates of validity for agentic AI systems.
By Murdoch J. Gabbay
Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort. Large language models (LLMs) promise to generate these proofs automatically, yet existing approaches wire a fixed, human-designed proof strategy into the system and constrain the model to follow it (retrieving premises and predicting tactics one step at a time, or splitting goals by divide-and-conquer), and still prove only a fraction of their target theorems.
arXiv:2607. 06341v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Formal verification offers the strongest guarantee of software correctness, but it does not scale: the proofs demanded by interactive theorem provers such as Coq require enormous expert effort.
By Shuangxiang Kan, Shuanglong Kan, Sebastian Ertel
arXiv:2608. 13522v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly used for programming, but do not provide any guarantee on the correctness of generated code.
By Zhe Ye, Hantao Lou, Yuechun Sun, Peiyang Song, Zhengxu Yan, Timothe Kasriel, Qingyang Zhang, Kaiyu Yang, Soonho Kong, Jingxuan He, Dawn Song
arXiv:2607. 01223v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When should an AI system's answer be trusted?
By Ben Slivinski, Michael Saldivar
arXiv:2511. 06701v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI-Scientist systems risk manufacturing spurious discoveries through uncontrolled multiple testing.
By Karen Sargsyan