arXiv:2608. 22915v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time pipelines often sample multiple outputs, filter them with a learned safety model, and return the proxy-feasible output with the highest learned reward.
By Akifumi Wachi, Takumi Tanabe, Youhei Akimoto
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
By Long P. Hoang, Hai V. Le, Shaoyang Xu, Wei Lu, Wenxuan Zhang
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
By Yoshua Bengio, Oliver Richardson, Tom\'a\v{s} Gaven\v{c}iak, Michael Cohen, Rory Svarc, Damiano Fornasiere, Gael Gendron, David Hyland, Aton Kamanda, Adam Oberman, Francis Rhys Ward, Anna Gaven\v{c}iak, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Vincent Mai, Iulian Serban, Joumana Ghosn
arXiv:2606. 30627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Conservative offline training is widely advocated as a safe foundation for subsequent online adaptation: if a policy stays close to well-supported behaviour, the argument goes, it is less likely to exploit imperfections in a learned reward model.
By Subramanyam Sahoo, Aman Chadha, Vinija Jain, Divya Chaudhary
arXiv:2607. 09706v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models turn a worded situation into a numeric plan, and the dominant pipelines (NL4Opt, OptiMUS, ORLM, OR-LLM-Agent) commit to a single objective and point-valued coefficients, then solve once.
By Suyash Mishra