The Hallucinations Leaderboard, an Open Effort to Measure Hallucinations in Large Language Models
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arXiv:2603. 09986v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Hallucinations, the tendency for large language models to provide responses with factually incorrect and unsupported claims, is a serious problem within natural language processing for which we do not yet have an effective solution to mitigate against.
arXiv:2504. 10020v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Contrastive decoding strategies are widely used to reduce object hallucinations in multimodal large language models (MLLMs).
arXiv:2604. 10697v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models frequently exhibit hallucinations: fluent and confident outputs that are factually incorrect or unsupported by the input context.
arXiv:2606. 00819v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved strong performance across diverse natural language tasks, yet their outputs often suffer from hallucinations -- content that is misaligned with factual information.
arXiv:2606. 27679v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Probe-based uncertainty estimation (UE) has emerged as a prominent approach to detect hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by learning uncertainty from internal model signals.
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) produce hallucinations—outputs that are fabricated, unverifiable, or contradictory to source material—and argues that these hallucinations have philosophical implications for machine consciousness. It reviews known causes such as source‑target divergence, training‑inference discrepancies, and overfitting, and presents two empirical studies: one showing that higher temperature settings in GPT models yield plausible but incorrect answers, while lower temperatures produce accurate ones; and another demonstrating that an encoder‑only model trained on encyclopedic data answers factually without embellishment, suggesting hallucinations arise from exposure to subjective, socially diverse data rather than cognitive ability. Drawing on Turing, Searle’s Chinese Room, the frame problem, and cybernetic theory, the authors contend that a model’s self‑reports of emotion or sentience fall within the definition of hallucination, implying that any future machine consciousness may remain epistemically inaccessible because it would be indistinguishable from an advanced hallucination.