arXiv:2606. 03305v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmark contamination, where evaluation examples appear in a model's training data, threatens the validity of LLM assessment.
By Wojciech Zarzecki, Jan Dubi\'nski, Sebastian Cygert
arXiv:2604. 01904v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Post-hoc unauthorized-training data detection for large language models (LLMs) typically assumes a query-with-originals regime: rights holders query a target LLM with raw proprietary data and assess whether the model assigns them stronger memorization-based detection signals, e.
By Muxing Li, Zesheng Ye, Sharon Li, Feng Liu
arXiv:2608.21230v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Persistent memory makes false information durable: once a false statement is stored, it can be retrieved into future sessions that match it. We measu...
By Arulnidhi Karunanidhi
arXiv:2608. 16643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automated detection of errors in clinical documentation is a promising application of large language models (LLMs), yet decisions to deploy such models rest on benchmarks that evaluate each clinical note in isolation.
By Yifan Zhang, Rahmatollah Beheshti
The paper investigates how benchmark contamination—leakage of test items into training data—affects large language model (LLM) leaderboards. By comparing original test items with semantically equivalent paraphrases, the authors measure contamination as a violation of anchor-item invariance and find that it inflates absolute scores but rarely changes model rankings. Across 47 public models and 74 finetuned models on four benchmarks, the rank correlation between standard and paraphrase-controlled leaderboards is 0.997, with only a handful of cases showing differential contamination that could alter rankings.
By Xingyao Xiao (Stanford University), Yihong Cheng (City University of Macau)
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
By Pushkal Kumar, Tucker Nielson, Tanish Kolhe, Shubham Zala, Vincent Li