arXiv:2511. 19517v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), where a small initial request paves the way for a more significant one, to bypass safety alignments, pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs).
By Adarsh Kumarappan, Ananya Mujoo
arXiv:2606. 10740v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation.
By Sai Kartheek Reddy Kasu, Nils Lukas, Samuele Poppi
arXiv:2606. 01738v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination.
By Zhiqing Ma, Zhonghao Xu, Dong Yu, Chen Kang, Changliang Li, Pengyuan Liu
arXiv:2503. 15560v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses.
By Prashant Kulkarni, Assaf Namer
arXiv:2607. 26820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from standalone assistants into autonomous agents, ensuring their safety requires shifting beyond pointwise risk assessment to understand how risks emerge and unfold over long-horizon trajectories.
By Shi Lin, Peng Qian, Dinghao Liu, Renjie Sun, Sifan Wu, Dezhang Kong, Chenpei Wang, Xun Wang
arXiv:2606. 03812v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems, demand reliable hazard identification.
By Sanjay Das, Ran Elgedawy, Ethan Seefried, Ryan Burchfield, Tirthankar Ghosal