arXiv:2611.06498v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Offline retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) on edge devices is updated through signed knowledge packs that carry text and precomputed embedding vect...
By Georgios Feretzakis, Alexandros Papaspyridis
arXiv:2609. 16391v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Weight-only post-training quantization is the cheapest way to shrink a retrieval embedder, and the received advice for applying it -- protect the embedding table, allocate bits by module sensitivity, prefer a ranking-aware objective over weight reconstruction -- was carried into LLM quantization largely intact.
By Hyojung Han
arXiv:2609.00470v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds large language models in external corpora, but implicit trust in retrieved documents creates a critical at...
By Muhaimin Bin Munir, Akib Jawad Ononto, Nazia Shehnaz Joynab, Bhavani Thuraisingham, Latifur Khan
arXiv:2608. 28389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) augments LLMs with external documents, but public or user-editable sources expose RAG systems to data poisoning: attackers can inject malicious documents to steer outputs toward targeted answers.
By Jaewon Jung, Haizhong Zheng, Hongsun Jang, Jaeyong Song, Beidi Chen, Jinho Lee
arXiv:2606. 27976v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings underpin semantic search and RAG, yet a leaked vector store hands much of the underlying text back to whoever holds it.
By Sergey Kurilenko
arXiv:2606. 26373v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings power semantic search and retrieval-augmented generation, but embedding-inversion attacks can reconstruct source text from a vector: when a vector database leaks, the documents behind it leak too.
By Sergey Kurilenko