Offline retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) on edge devices is updated through signed knowledge packs that carry text and precomputed embedding vectors. A signature proves who published a pack, not t...
arXiv:2609. 16391v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Weight-only post-training quantization is the cheapest way to shrink a retrieval embedder, and the received advice for applying it -- protect the embedding table, allocate bits by module sensitivity, prefer a ranking-aware objective over weight reconstruction -- was carried into LLM quantization largely intact.
By Hyojung Han
arXiv:2609.00470v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds large language models in external corpora, but implicit trust in retrieved documents creates a critical at...
By Muhaimin Bin Munir, Akib Jawad Ononto, Nazia Shehnaz Joynab, Bhavani Thuraisingham, Latifur Khan
arXiv:2608. 28389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) augments LLMs with external documents, but public or user-editable sources expose RAG systems to data poisoning: attackers can inject malicious documents to steer outputs toward targeted answers.
By Jaewon Jung, Haizhong Zheng, Hongsun Jang, Jaeyong Song, Beidi Chen, Jinho Lee
arXiv:2606. 27976v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings underpin semantic search and RAG, yet a leaked vector store hands much of the underlying text back to whoever holds it.
By Sergey Kurilenko
arXiv:2606. 12703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions.
By Tarun Sharma
Public institutions hold large volumes of sensitive documents and support tickets that cannot leave the premises, ruling out cloud-hosted language models entirely. We report on RAGAL, a retrieval-augmented assistant for the technical-support team of AFIR, the Romanian Agency for Financing Rural Investments, built and operated under three hard constraints: zero data egress (no external API calls, even for synthetic data), a read-only mandate (the assistant drafts, humans execute), and a single 8 GB consumer laptop as the only development and training machine.
arXiv:2606. 26373v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings power semantic search and retrieval-augmented generation, but embedding-inversion attacks can reconstruct source text from a vector: when a vector database leaks, the documents behind it leak too.
By Sergey Kurilenko
Spruce is a system that enables scalable private outsourced retrieval by learning compact binary embeddings and using efficient Hamming-distance computation under a two‑server multi‑party computation protocol. It replaces costly corpus‑wide embedding scoring with a fixed‑radius protocol that avoids multi‑round candidate selection, and introduces private cluster pruning and a one‑core dealer to reduce computation and eliminate OT preprocessing bottlenecks. Across corpora of 383K–5.42M documents, Spruce maintains original search quality while achieving up to 31.5× higher throughput and reducing query times to a few seconds.
By Peichun Hua, Yunming Xiao
MOMAT (Mixture of Multiple Atlases) is a hardware‑enhanced safety framework designed to defend quantized large language models (qLLMs) on edge devices against jailbreak attacks. It uses a collection of semantic atlases—each containing harmful or benign sample clusters and policy templates—to perform domain‑localized Retrieval‑Augmented Generation. A lightweight Mixture of Experts detector evaluates top‑k similarity features retrieved by a Compute‑in‑Memory (CiM) accelerated engine, achieving a 4.69 × 10⁶‑fold speedup and a 2.5 × 10⁵‑fold energy reduction compared to DRAM‑based baselines while matching state‑of‑the‑art defense performance.
By Boyang Li, Bingyu Shen, Weihao Hong, Zhiyuan Jiang, Xinlei Guan, Yan Ma, Miles Q. Li, Yi Sheng, Ruiyang Qin
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
By Pushkal Kumar, Tucker Nielson, Tanish Kolhe, Shubham Zala, Vincent Li
Spruce is a system that enables secure, private retrieval of large document collections outsourced to untrusted clouds by learning compact binary embeddings that preserve search quality while drastically reducing computation and communication. It replaces expensive corpus-wide embedding scoring with efficient Hamming-distance calculations under a two-server multi-party computation protocol, and introduces a fixed-radius protocol, private cluster pruning, and a one-core dealer to further cut latency and bandwidth usage. Across corpora ranging from 383K to 5.42M documents, Spruce maintains original search quality, achieving up to 6.7× faster full scans and 22.9× speedups with pruning, while retaining over 94% of the original NDCG.