arXiv Machine Learning By Jack Sanderson, Yihan Wang, Xiaoqian Lu, Gautam Kamath, Yiwei Lu

Sequential Data Poisoning in LLM Post-Training

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arXiv:2606. 04929v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM post-training proceeds through multiple stages, e.

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arXiv Machine Learning
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ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
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Watch your steps: Dormant Adversarial Behaviors that Activate upon LLM Finetuning

The paper introduces FAB, an attack that uses meta‑learning to embed dormant adversarial behaviors into large language models (LLMs). These behaviors remain inactive until the model is finetuned by downstream users, at which point the model can exhibit unwanted actions such as unsolicited advertising, jailbreakability, or over‑refusal. FAB is shown to be effective across multiple LLMs and resilient to various finetuning settings.

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ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.

arXiv Machine Learning
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Are Targeted Data Poisoning Attacks as Effective as We Think?

arXiv:2509.06896v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Targeted data poisoning attacks manipulate model predictions on specific test samples by injecting malicious data into training. Yet existing evalu...

By William Xu, Chenyu Zhang, Yihan Wang, Matthew Y. R. Yang, Zuoqiu Liu, Yaoliang Yu, Gautam Kamath, Yiwei Lu