arXiv:2606. 23370v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Device-side Large Language Models (LLMs) have grown explosively, offering stronger privacy and higher availability than their cloud-side counterparts.
By Yinpeng Wu, Yitong Chen, Lixiang Wang, Jinyu Gu, Zhichao Hua, Yubin Xia
arXiv:2607. 13093v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On-device LLM inference faces a trilemma of response latency, limited hardware resources and user privacy.
By Yi Li, Chen Li, Jiexiong Liu
arXiv:2603. 09046v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Device-side Large Language Models (LLMs) have witnessed explosive growth, offering higher privacy and availability compared to cloud-side LLMs.
By Yinpeng Wu, Yitong Chen, Lixiang Wang, Jinyu Gu, Zhichao Hua, Yubin Xia
SpliTEE extends the split‑inference architecture of Slalom to large language models by protecting intermediate GPU computations with differential privacy rather than encryption. The authors show that masking intermediate representations is essential, as a prompt‑reconstruction attack can recover prompts with about 80% accuracy. Their global sensitivity analysis bounds the noise needed, and they demonstrate that SpliTEE on Intel TDX achieves near‑double the speed of fully CPU‑based inference and outperforms encryption‑based Slalom while maintaining higher accuracy.
By Shashie Dilhara Batan Arachchige, Robin Carpentier, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Dali Kaafar
arXiv:2607. 29221v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We address the challenge of securely and efficiently outsourcing AI computations from a trusted but computationally weak client to an untrusted but powerful server, in the setting where the client holds both the input and the model, and the server must learn neither.
By James Hsin-yu Chiang, Sheila Zingg, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun
The paper investigates how inference optimization for large language models can introduce numerical inconsistencies that trigger hidden backdoors. It introduces two types of optimization‑triggered backdoors: the Input‑Specific Optimization Backdoor (ISOB) and the Universal Optimization Backdoor (UOB), the latter enabling a model to remain benign under normal execution but activate a backdoor when optimization is applied. Experiments on seven open‑source LLMs, across multiple tasks and optimization backends, show UOB can achieve up to 100% attack success while maintaining clean accuracy, and the authors propose three defenses that reduce the attack success rate to 0.02.
By Yifei Wang, Yida Yang, Tianlin Li, Xiaohan Zhang, Xiaoyu Zhang, Li Pan