MiST (Mid-trained Security Transformer) is a suite of 8B and 32B language models tailored for cybersecurity, achieving strong performance on public benchmarks. The approach uses a mid-training stage that adapts general pre-trained models to the domain by curating a compact, expert-vetted seed corpus and generating high-quality synthetic training data, rather than continual pre-training on large raw text. MiST checkpoints improve mean cybersecurity accuracy by +13.1 and +8.6 absolute percentage points over Qwen baselines for 8B and 32B models, respectively, and provide a stronger initialization for downstream task-specific fine-tuning and reinforcement learning.
By Oded Ovadia, Elad Ben Zaken, Elad Guttman, Orly Moreno Kadosh
arXiv:2607. 02072v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in domains requiring guardrails to detect unsafe, off-topic, or adversarial prompts.
By Mahmoud Abdelfattah, Hamid Nasiri, Peter Garraghan
arXiv:2607. 19361v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Most safety guardrails for large language models (LLMs) evaluate each prompt-response pair in isolation, which misses failures that arise only over a dialogue as benign turns compose into harm.
By Sanjay Mishra, Divya Chukkapalli, Ganesh R. Naik
The paper evaluates System One decision models—typed models that output probabilities for branching decisions—against supervised classifiers and generative language models on automated decision gate tasks. Eight checkpoints from six families, including the hosted model Jev, were benchmarked on workflow, intent, and social‑science items, showing that small trained classifiers match or slightly outperform decision models on intent and workflow when labels are available, while decision models outperform zero‑shot classifiers when labels are absent. The study also explores calibration, risk thresholds, and cost‑efficiency trade‑offs, providing condition‑dependent design guidelines for automated decision gates.
By Amir Rafe, Subasish Das
arXiv:2606. 16244v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models routinely generate code with exploitable security flaws.
By Xiaoyun Xu, Lichao Wu, Jona te Lintelo, Siyu Zhang, Stjepan Picek
arXiv:2607. 13081v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion.
By SingGuard Team