arXiv:2607. 02121v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic systems become integrated into real-world applications, ensuring their safety and security is critical.
By William Hackett, Peter Garraghan
The paper introduces COLAGUARD, a guardrail model that embeds multi-step safety reasoning into a continuous latent space, allowing efficient hidden-state propagation during inference. Compared to existing methods, COLAGUARD achieves an 8.24‑point macro‑F1 improvement over Llama Guard 3 and matches the explicit reasoning baseline GuardReasoner, while delivering a 12.9× speedup and a 22.4× reduction in token usage across ten moderation settings and eight safety benchmarks.
By Siddharth Sai, Xiaofei Wen, Muhao Chen
Reflex-Guard is a lightweight, locally running guardrail for large language models that uses jailbreak-aware preprocessing, compact sentence‑transformer embeddings, and seven fast binary classifiers to filter unsafe prompts. It achieves 95.9% recall on harmful prompts with an end‑to‑end latency of 37.6 ms, far faster than existing solutions such as Llama Guard 2 (255 ms) and SafeDecoding (723 ms). The system can detect all GCG suffix attacks and Base64‑encoded prompts at the default threshold, and it attains a Reflex Efficiency Score up to 16.79, outperforming its competitors.
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.
The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can internally detect harmful content, bypassing external guardrails that add latency and computational cost. By extracting activations from LLaMA‑3.1‑8B and training lightweight MLP probes, the authors achieve high F1 scores (99%, 83%, and 84%) on WildJailbreak, Beavertails, and AEGIS 2.0 benchmarks, rivaling much larger guard models while reducing overhead. This suggests that internal state monitoring can provide efficient safety checks for resource‑constrained, time‑critical deployments.
By Alizishaan Khatri, Chiquita Prabhu, Omkar Neogi
arXiv:2607. 18268v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Real-world applications that use closed-source large language models (LLMs) need advanced safety measures that go beyond the basic content filters.
By Kumud Lakara, Ruibo Shi, Fran Silavong
arXiv:2606. 15396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malicious content generated from large language models (LLMs) could pose severe safety risks and ethical concerns.
By Wenbo Yu, Bohua Wang, Hao Fang, Kuofeng Gao, Jingru Zeng, Xiaochen Yang, Tianyi Zhang, Xiaoxiao Ma, Jiawei Kong, Hao Wu, Bin Chen, Shu-Tao Xia, Min Zhang
arXiv:2608.30703v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Runtime guardrails are essential for reliable large language model (LLM) deployment, yet existing approaches typically rely on independent, external...
By Sing Team
Reflex-Guard is a lightweight, locally‑run guardrail for large language models that uses jailbreak‑aware preprocessing, compact sentence‑transformer embeddings, and seven fast binary classifiers to filter unsafe prompts. It achieves 95.9 % recall on harmful prompts with an end‑to‑end latency of 37.6 ms, outperforming existing solutions such as Llama Guard 2 (255 ms) and SafeDecoding (723 ms). The system can detect all GCG suffix attacks and Base64‑encoded prompts at the default threshold, while DrAttack structured prompts require a lower threshold of 0.03 for optimal detection, and it attains a Reflex Efficiency Score of up to 16.79.
By Istiaque Ahmed, Afia Anjum Borsha, Ranat Das Prangon, Abu-fuad Ahmad, Thi Hong Tran
arXiv:2606. 05566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, but they remain vulnerable to Prompt Injection (PI) and Jailbreak (JB) attacks.
By Paulo Ricardo Ferreira Neves, Edson Rodrigues da Cruz Filho, Paulo Henrique Eleuterio Falsetti, Jo\~ao Vitor Pavan, Ian Degaspari, Henrique Vieira Laturrague, Patrick Vieira Laturrague, Guilherme Nielsen Dias, Marccello Wilson Perez Berto, Gustavo Voltani Von Atzingen
arXiv:2607. 19894v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs.
By Yuxi Li, Zhibo Zhang, Kailong Wang, Xingshuo Han, Ling Shi, Haoyu Wang
MiST (Mid-trained Security Transformer) is a suite of 8B and 32B language models tailored for cybersecurity, achieving strong performance on public benchmarks. The approach uses a mid-training stage that adapts general pre-trained models to the domain by curating a compact, expert-vetted seed corpus and generating high-quality synthetic training data, rather than continual pre-training on large raw text. MiST checkpoints improve mean cybersecurity accuracy by +13.1 and +8.6 absolute percentage points over Qwen baselines for 8B and 32B models, respectively, and provide a stronger initialization for downstream task-specific fine-tuning and reinforcement learning.
By Oded Ovadia, Elad Ben Zaken, Elad Guttman, Orly Moreno Kadosh