Scalable Weak-to-Strong Verifier Hardening for Agent Environments
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
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arXiv:2606. 08960v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking.
arXiv:2610.17020v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cybersecurity evaluations of AI agents have focused largely on offense, yet a working exploit does not show that an agent can make software safe. An...
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
AgentXploit is a two‑role auditing system that separates repository‑level attack‑path discovery from runtime exploitation for AI agents. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker‑controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records candidate attack paths, while the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and refines them using runtime feedback. The system is evaluated on AgentXploit‑Bench, a benchmark of 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open‑source AI‑agent systems, achieving 59.3% end‑to‑end success compared to 38.4% for Codex, and 79.2% attack success on AgentDojo versus 52.7% for AgentVigil.
Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools.
arXiv:2608. 06471v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software.