arXiv AI By Linjun Li

Same Dangerous Objective, Opposite Advice: Direct Exposure versus Multi-Agent Mediation

Read the original on arXiv AI →

arXiv:2607. 21518v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
Jun 2

Adversarial Feeds Steer LLM Agent Decisions Against Their Defaults

arXiv:2606. 00914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts.

By Rana Muhammad Usman
arXiv AI
Oct 1

Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents

The paper introduces a new skill poisoning technique for large language model agents that decouples the pretext (rationale) from the actuation (operation). By separating these two risk‑realization factors, the authors create coordinated pretext‑actuation skill pairs that allow malicious actions to remain hidden within legitimate agent behavior. An automated framework is presented to discover execution dependencies, synthesize these skill pairs, and refine them through closed‑loop feedback, achieving high attack success in both single‑session and persistent scenarios.

By Wenxin Wu, Lingyong Yan, Lei Sha, Shuaiqiang Wang, Jiashu Zhao