arXiv:2608. 06690v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Most language-model access controls regulate behavior while leaving the same computation available to every request.
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arXiv:2608.30041v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents place outputs from external skills into their execution context, allowing attacker-controlled data to influence later pri...
arXiv:2609.05770v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differentially private (DP) fine-tuning methods treat sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models as a single dense block, ignoring that shared layers see a...
arXiv:2604. 16870v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP).
arXiv:2606. 09549v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.