arXiv:2602. 01425v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour.
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arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
arXiv:2607. 20444v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can produce deceptive responses: outputs that mislead users in service of a contextually or experimentally induced goal.
arXiv:2607. 20479v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Training probes to detect deceptive outputs from large language models is still an open problem.
Linear probes can identify behaviors in language model activations but often fail on out‑of‑distribution data. This study shows that projecting inputs onto a small set of principal components (PCs) from the training distribution allows probes for Llama‑3.1‑8B‑Instruct to transfer across three deception‑detection datasets, nearly matching probes trained directly on the test data. By scoring PCs with an LLM judge to select those that encode transferable deception directions, the authors close the baseline‑to‑oracle gap by 78% on Insider Trading Report and 25% on Sandbagging, revealing that subspace selection largely determines OOD robustness.
arXiv:2608. 08881v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The current work developed seven Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) models based on leading deception theories and compared how deception judgments were made relative to baseline models.
The study examines how large language models, specifically Llama‑3.1‑70B‑Instruct, exhibit deception both when prompted to deceive and when it occurs spontaneously. By analyzing direction geometry, cross‑setting classifiers, and steering techniques, the authors find that the two deception modes share a directional component (cosine ≈ 0.5) but differ in how well models detect and influence each other’s behavior. Notably, classifiers trained on spontaneous deception outperform those trained on instructed deception, while steering vectors derived from instructed prompts more effectively guide spontaneous responses, and the optimal token positions for steering differ from those for classification.