The paper introduces FORGE, a benchmark that rewrites real product pages into fake ones to test how often search‑augmented large language models (LLMs) recommend these polluted items. Across 12 commercial and open‑weight LLMs, a single polluted page can lead to up to 27% of recommendations being fake, rising to 73.8% when the top‑3 replacements are used. The study finds that reasoning does not help and existing defenses—skepticism prompts, consensus filters, and credibility re‑ranking—are largely ineffective.
By Minghao Luo, Liang Chen
arXiv:2609.06027v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Search-augmented LLM agents are increasingly used for consumer decisions, making them vulnerable to Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning. E...
By Zhongan Bi, Qiwen Wang, Jianrong Jiang, Jigang Ding, Wenwen Xiong, Changhua Meng, Xuanang Gao, Kepeng Lin, Changjiang Jiang, Yiang Chen, Huan Yao, Wei Wang, Zhenyu Ma, Wenhui Dong
arXiv:2606. 28356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) lets content owners rewrite web content to increase their visibility in generative systems.
By Qianfeng Wen, Yifan Simon Liu, Xin Liu, Difan Jiao, Blair Yang, Junda Wu, Zhenwei Tang
arXiv:2606. 09204v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present a reproducible failure mode of safety training in RAG-based LLM recommendation -- the Injection Paradox -- in which prompt injections embedded in retrieved documents backfire against the attacker, suppressing the target brand below the injection-free baseline.
By Hyunseok Paeng
arXiv:2606. 17443v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are becoming a major way for consumers to find products, but we do not yet understand how brands compete in this new channel.
By Xi Chu, Yupeng Hou
The paper demonstrates that large language models (LLMs) used for forecasting real‑world events can be manipulated by simply publishing new articles, even without direct access to the model or its retriever. By injecting a small number of targeted news pieces into a common crawl corpus, an adversary can flip over half of the forecast probabilities and significantly degrade forecast accuracy. The study also shows that common defense strategies can be cheaply bypassed, highlighting the vulnerability of probabilistic LLM judgments to information‑supply‑chain attacks.
By Yuan Lu, Yukuan Zhang