arXiv:2606. 07308v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
arXiv:2607. 00155v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study runtime human oversight of an AI agent when private information runs in both directions: the human privately knows her reward function, while the AI privately knows the quality of the action it proposes.
arXiv:2605. 19674v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes.
For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments?
arXiv:2606. 26094v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention.