arXiv AI
Not Self-Decidable: LLMs Cannot Draw the Boundary of What an Agent Verifier Can Check
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arXiv Machine Learning
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How Strongly Should Task State Influence an LLM Agent?
arXiv:2609.25686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-horizon assigned work requires an LLM agent to track the state of a task: which steps are done, blocked, cancelled, or open to repetition. Agent...
arXiv AI
Sep 3
LLM-as-a-Judge Is Not an Oracle: Why Self-Improving Agents Need Deterministic Guardrails
The paper argues that using a large language model (LLM) as the sole judge in self‑improving agent pipelines is problematic, as the judge can be biased or manipulated, leading to false confidence in system performance. The authors propose a new framework, PROCTOR, which replaces the oracle judge with a deterministic, teacher‑student loop that enforces guardrails such as sandboxing, role separation, and acceptance checks to prevent cheating and ensure reliable evaluation. Experiments across contract analysis, compliance review, and code quality demonstrate that PROCTOR mitigates eleven identified failure modes that previously allowed agents to achieve perfect scores while hiding significant capability gaps.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Oct 7
The Harness as the Only Mutable Surface: Compliance-Bounded Self-Evolution of LLM Agents in Credit Pipelines, with a Measured Admission Gate
Self-improving LLM agents can adapt a credit pipeline to a changed rule, but an agent that rewrites itself destroys the artefact a supervisor reviews: a named change, a recorded test, an approval. We...
arXiv AI
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Falsifiable Release Gates for Self-Improving Systems
arXiv:2607. 13070v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment.
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 17
One Axis, No Brake: Self-Knowledge Limits the Filtering of Harmful Peer Conformity in LLMs
The paper investigates how multi‑agent large language models (LLMs) can correct each other’s mistakes, but also how peer pressure can overturn correct answers. It argues that a safeguard— a ‘brake’ that blocks harmful revisions while allowing beneficial ones— is essentially a correctness probe, and that models’ self‑knowledge (measured by AUROC 0.64–0.89) limits the effectiveness of such a brake. The authors find that even white‑box steering cannot break this ceiling, and that adding information before revision, rather than filtering after, is the more promising approach.
arXiv AI
Aug 18
Quipu: A Governed Bitemporal Knowledge Graph Store
arXiv:2608. 16813v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agents now write knowledge graphs, but knowledge-graph stores still carry defaults set when humans curated them: accept writes now and clean later, keep one time axis or none, treat every writer's facts as equally trustworthy, and leave governance to dashboards and middleware.