NeuronFuzz: Safety Neuron Guided Fuzzing for LLM Safety Evaluation
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NeuronFuzz is a white‑box fuzzing framework that uses internal safety neurons of large language models as continuous feedback for safety evaluation, eliminating the need to generate full model responses during testing. It constructs a SafetyOracle that converts neuron activations into a differentiable safety alarm score, enabling gradient‑based identification of sensitive template positions and fluent, context‑compatible prompt mutations. Evaluated on 21 text and multimodal models, NeuronFuzz achieves a 76‑100% jailbreak discovery rate on five white‑box source models and demonstrates strong zero‑shot transfer to open‑weight and proprietary targets.
arXiv:2602. 16835v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety alignment is essential for the responsible deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs).
arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.
arXiv:2509. 03985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In deployment and application, large language models (LLMs) typically undergo safety alignment to prevent illegal and unethical outputs.
arXiv:2606. 03486v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that hide harmful intent behind seemingly ordinary requests such as role-play, translation, encoding, adversarial suffixes, and multi-turn buildup.
AlcaTRAz is a prompt‑level defense that uses rule trees to insert controlled character‑level perturbations into input text, disrupting jailbreak attacks without modifying or retraining the target LLM. It operates solely on the input, making it suitable for black‑box deployments, and was evaluated on 33 open‑weight models and 22 jailbreak types, outperforming three baseline defenses in 73.4 % of model‑attack combinations. While it significantly reduces high‑severity jailbreak success, it does not eliminate it and is intended as one layer of a broader defense strategy.