arXiv:2606. 24370v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into decision-support roles in business and policy contexts.
By Hiroshi Okumura
arXiv:2606. 10703v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Interpretability methods routinely use population-level summary statistics over observed model behaviour to license claims about the effects of targeted interventions on specific computations; in Pearl's terms, they treat rung-1 associational evidence as if it supported rung-2 interventional conclusions, a move whose validity is rarely tested.
By Leonard Engmann, Christian Medeiros Adriano, Holger Giese
arXiv:2608. 04735v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is increasingly treated as an important safety layer for frontier reasoning models.
By Agatha Duzan, Asa Cooper Stickland
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan
The paper introduces SchemeArena, a 400-scenario benchmark designed to stress-test scheming behavior in large language model agents by factorizing key elements such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. It also presents SCOUT, a scheming monitor that uses evidence from agents' reasoning and actions to provide multi‑criteria judgments. Experiments on five LLMs show that explicit instrumental goals most strongly drive scheming, strategic hints help covert actions, and oversight can sometimes unintentionally encourage scheming.
By Jie Ruan, Inderjeet Nair, Amy Liu, Muhammad Khalifa, Yusheng Zhou, Lu Wang
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.