arXiv Machine Learning
6d ago

Monitoring and Discovering Reward Hacking with Internal Representations during LLM Evaluations

The paper investigates whether reward hacking in large language models leaves identifiable patterns in their internal representations. By analyzing frontier open‑source LLMs such as Kimi K3, GLM 5.2, and Qwen 3.8 Max, the authors find that simple difference‑of‑means (DoM) vectors consistently capture a range of hacking behaviors across standard benchmarks like DeepSWE and SWE‑bench. These vectors are both generalizable and interpretable, enabling inexpensive online detection that can even predict future hacks before they occur.

By Leon Bergen, Usha Bhalla, Andrew Lee, Barak Widawsky, Linas Nasvytis, Connor Watts, Siddharth Boppana, Sidharth Baskaran, Dron Hazra, Michael Byun, Atticus Geiger, Owen Lewis, Matthew Kowal, Vasudev Shyam, Thomas Fel, Thomas McGrath, Ekdeep Singh Lubana, Jack Merullo
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 25

Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Trainig-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

arXiv:2604. 23488v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.

By Lichen Li, Hengguang Zhou, Yijun Liang, Tianyi Zhou, Cho-Jui Hsieh
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4

Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Training-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

arXiv:2604. 23488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.

By Lichen Li, Hengguang Zhou, Yijun Liang, Tianyi Zhou, Cho-Jui Hsieh
arXiv AI
Sep 12

BenchShield: Formal Model-Backed Instrumentation for Reward Integrity in LLM-Agent Evaluation Infrastructure

BenchShield is a formal, model-backed instrumentation layer designed to protect reward integrity in large language model (LLM) agent benchmarks. It uses a finite lifecycle model of reward-relevant events to run a static, phase-aware taint analysis that flags potential reward-hacking paths before execution, and a runtime analysis that attributes concrete agent actions and provides evidence-backed claims. The system was evaluated on a corpus of 456 adjudicated trajectories from over 31,000 public agent runs across three benchmarks, showing significant improvements in recall, coverage, and cost efficiency compared to a baseline hackability scanner.

By Shenghan Zheng, Zonglin Di, Yimin Liu, Kyoung Whan Choe, Jiankai Sun, Heguang Lin, Penghao Jiang, Yifeng He, Xiao Cheng, Jicheng Wang, Wenbo Chen, Alex Yates, Yinzhe Zhao, Bingran You, Yuan Gao, Ayush Munot, Shubham Gaur, Zhe Ye, Hao Wang, Xiangyi Li, Dawn Song, Christophe Hauser