arXiv Computation and Language By Zi Liang, Ronghua Li, Yanyun Wang, Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu

Mobius Injection: From One-Shot Prompt Injection to Sustained Resource Exhaustion in AI Agent Infrastructure

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The paper introduces Mobius Injection, a new attack that turns autonomous LLM agents into zombie nodes capable of launching Agent-based and -Oriented DDoS (AbO-DDoS) attacks. By combining indirect prompt injection with persistent agent components through a mechanism called Semantic Closure, a single injection event can trigger sustained recursive execution of agent components. Experiments on three claw-style agents and three coding agents across 12 LLMs show that Mobius Injection can amplify single-node calls up to 51×, drain 123k–127k tokens per node on a shared five‑GPU backend, and increase benign request latency by 23–24×, eventually saturating shared capacity and denying service to legitimate traffic.

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