The paper examines privacy risks in large language models (LLMs) through a unified threat model and systematic ablation study of four attacks: Membership Inference, Attribute Inference, Data Extraction, and Backdoor Attacks. It finds that membership inference is highly sensitive to dataset and attack strategy, attribute inference depends on model and training characteristics, data extraction grows with model size and repeated training data, and backdoor attacks consistently succeed. The authors provide practical recommendations for privacy‑aware LLM deployment, such as prioritizing membership leakage checks in retrieval‑augmented systems, reducing repeated personal data in training, monitoring attribute inference, and protecting fine‑tuning pipelines from backdoors.
By Karima Makhlouf, Lamiaa Basyoni, Syed Khaderi, Gabriel Marquez, Peter Sotomango, Mahmoud Awawdah, Sami Zhioua
arXiv:2606. 06334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Counterfactuals are typically used in high-stakes decision areas to explain a machine learning model by showing how changes to the user profiles result in the desired outcome.
By Maryam Babaei, Yingke Wang, Hadrien Lautraite, Heber H. Arcolezi, Ulrich Aivodji, Sebastien Gambs
The paper evaluates membership inference attacks (MIAs) on NLP text classifiers using the GLUE SST‑2 sentiment dataset. It compares a TF‑IDF + Logistic Regression pipeline with a fine‑tuned DistilBERT model under a loss‑threshold MIA, finding that both models leak membership signals despite high accuracy. The study also tests mitigations, showing that stronger regularization reduces leakage for Logistic Regression at a utility cost, while fine‑tuning DistilBERT for fewer epochs lowers leakage with minimal accuracy loss.
By William Novak (Minot State University), Muhammad Abusaqer (Minot State University)
arXiv:2606. 17464v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are a canonical way to assess a machine learning model's privacy properties.
By Jeffrey G. Wang, Jason Wang, Marvin Li, Seth Neel
arXiv:2410. 06814v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Over-parameterized models are typically vulnerable to membership inference attacks, which aim to determine whether a specific sample is included in the training of a given model.
By Hengxiang Zhang, Qiang Hu, Hongxin Wei
The paper introduces Pairwise Likelihood MIA (PL‑MIA), a unified membership inference attack that combines a Gaussian likelihood‑ratio statistic with population calibration and the Cauchy combination test. PL‑MIA generates p‑values from pairwise comparisons between a query point and reference points, then aggregates these continuous signals using the Cauchy test to preserve evidence strength. Experiments show that PL‑MIA surpasses strong baselines, boosting true positive rates by over 25% in low‑false‑positive settings, thereby validating the theoretical advantages of the proposed statistical framework.
By Shengjie Niu, Zebin Yun, Yeheng Ge, Jian Huang