arXiv AI By Dohun Lee, Hyunwoo Park

Market Signal Injection: Adversarial Context Manipulation of LLM Pricing Agents

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The paper introduces Market Signal Injection (MSI), an attack that alters how market data is formatted or described—without changing its numerical values—to influence large language model (LLM) pricing agents. Experiments on nine open‑weight and three proprietary models in simulated duopoly and triopoly markets show that sentiment‑based formatting changes cause significant shifts in firm behavior, profits, and consumer surplus. The study also demonstrates that model susceptibility varies across families, that larger models are not always more robust, and that techniques such as input canonicalization and decision boundary anchoring can partially mitigate these attacks.

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