arXiv AI
How User-AI Mistreatment Occurs and Matters in Conversational Systems?
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arXiv AI
5d ago
Useless but Safe? Benchmarking Utility Recovery with User Intent Clarification in Multi-Turn Conversations
The paper introduces CarryOnBench, an interactive benchmark that tests whether large language models can revise their interpretation of user intent and recover utility while staying safe in multi‑turn conversations. Using 398 harmful‑looking queries with benign intents, the benchmark simulates 5,970 conversations across 14 models, evaluating both intent‑aligned utility and safety with a new metric called Ben‑Util. Results show that models often withhold information due to misinterpretation, but most can recover with clarifications, revealing failure modes such as unsafe and redundant recovery that single‑turn tests miss.
arXiv Computation and Language
4d ago
Benchmarking Factual Robustness of LLMs via Multi-conversation Persuasion
The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.
arXiv AI
Aug 11
TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories
arXiv:2604. 07223v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces.
arXiv AI
Jun 30
Echoes of Human Malice in Agents: Benchmarking LLMs for Multi-Turn Online Harassment Attacks
arXiv:2510. 14207v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are powering a growing share of interactive web applications, yet remain vulnerable to misuse and harm.
arXiv AI
Aug 11
Automating Deception: Scalable Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks
arXiv:2511. 19517v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), where a small initial request paves the way for a more significant one, to bypass safety alignments, pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs).
arXiv AI
Aug 24
Truth Lies Deep: Countering Semantic Camouflage via Latent Intent Verification
The paper identifies a vulnerability in large language models where harmful intent can be hidden within benign narratives, a phenomenon termed Semantic Camouflage. By examining latent activation patterns across several small language model families, the authors discover an "Intent Horizon"—a layer depth where harmful intent representations collapse. They propose Latent Intent Verification (LIV), a lightweight probing defense that detects harmful intent in early layers and outperforms existing guardrails on the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset.