arXiv AI By Qian Ma, Chen Wu, Prasenjit Mitra, Sencun Zhu

How to Backdoor Image Knowledge Distillation

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The paper demonstrates that image knowledge distillation can be backdoored even when the teacher model is clean, by poisoning the distillation dataset with triggered and manipulated images that the teacher already classifies as a target label. The attack, effective at poisoning rates as low as 10%, uses targeted adversarial perturbations and GAN-based class transitions to embed a backdoor into the student model while preserving its performance on clean data. The study highlights that the security of knowledge distillation depends not only on the teacher but also on the integrity of the distillation data.

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