arXiv AI
HazardAuditor: From Executable Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents
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SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces
arXiv:2605.12015v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Reusable skills are becoming a common interface for extending large language model agents, packaging procedural guidance with access to files...
arXiv AI
Aug 19
HarnessRisk: A Lifecycle-Oriented Benchmark for Agent Harness Safety
HarnessRisk is a lifecycle-oriented benchmark for evaluating safety in agent harnesses that manage tools, extensions, state, permissions, and external actions. It defines six operational phases—Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery—and includes 128 sandboxed cases pairing benign user objectives with adversarial instructions. Across three harnesses, six language models, and 14 configurations, attack success rates vary from 12.6% to 80.9%, with the most vulnerable phase being Harness Configuration. "whyItMatters":"The benchmark demonstrates that safety failures can arise in multiple harness responsibilities and that even explicit risk detection does not guarantee safe action, underscoring the need for comprehensive evaluation across model and harness configurations."
arXiv AI
Jun 16
OSGuard: A Benchmark for Safety in Computer-Use Agents
arXiv:2606. 15034v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Computer-use agents are increasingly evaluated by whether they complete realistic desktop and web tasks.
arXiv AI
Sep 2
OpenAgentFlow: Enabling System-Wide Safety Boundaries for Heterogeneous AI Agent Fleets
arXiv:2609.00015v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, control...
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 19
AgentArmor: A Framework, Evaluation, \& Mitigation of Coding Agent Failures
arXiv:2606. 19380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Software engineering and deployment are increasingly being delegated to AI coding agents.
arXiv AI
Jun 18
SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.