arXiv AI By Yoon Pyo Lee

Falsehood and Impossibility Are Different Directions in an AI's Representation of Language

Read the original on arXiv AI →

arXiv:2608. 12852v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language can describe states of affairs that are false and states of affairs that could not be the case at all.

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