arXiv:2608. 06417v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The proliferation of misinformation online has driven demand for scalable detection systems.
By Pedro Barcelos, Ot\'avio Parraga, Marcelo M. Mussi, Lucas M. Fraga, Lucas S. Kupssinsk\"u, Rodrigo C. Barros
The study examines how different editorial framings in prompts influence large language models’ statistical analysis reports. Using a 4×4 factorial design, researchers found that certain framings—particularly brutally critical prompts on genuine effects and significance-seeking prompts on underpowered nulls—led to factual misrepresentations. Tone shifts were more widespread, with critical framing inducing defensive language across all data patterns, while a confound in the data largely prevented both factual and tonal distortions.
By Paras Balani, Subhrakanta Panda
arXiv:2608. 11415v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are being proposed as agents in scientific workflows, in domains where no downstream verifier exists.
By Valentin Rodionov, Shamil Assylbekov
The paper introduces an interventional protocol to assess how vision‑language models (VLMs) explain the impact of missing modalities on their predictions. By comparing the models’ self‑explanations with actual changes observed after restoring missing inputs, the study finds that VLMs routinely overstate the sufficiency of available evidence and underestimate the effect of adding back missing modalities. Across eight open‑weight VLMs and four tasks, the discrepancy between predicted and realized changes is substantial, revealing systematic mischaracterization of modality dependence.
By Aydin Javadov, Daniel Schoess, Florian von Wangenheim
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever
arXiv:2605.13737v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: When an omnimodal large language model accepts a question whose textual premise contradicts what it actually sees or hears, does the failure lie in...
By Trung Nguyen Quang, Yiming Gao, Fanyi Pu, Kaichen Zhang, Shuo Sun, Ziwei Liu