arXiv:2603. 18385v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS).
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2512. 10279v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information.
arXiv:2512. 07901v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2608. 13297v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In evolutionary search, a weak child can be a valuable ancestor that makes high-fitness regions reachable.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
We’ve discovered that evolution strategies (ES), an optimization technique that’s been known for decades, rivals the performance of standard reinforcement learning (RL) techniques on modern RL benchmarks (e. g.