Agentic systems entering production typically operate as partially integrated assemblies where structural defects, not task-level errors, dominate the failure landscape. At this maturity level, task-level error detection may be infeasible: structural failure modes mask the signal that task-level monitors are designed to detect.
arXiv:2606. 02494v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic systems entering production typically operate as partially integrated assemblies where structural defects, not task-level errors, dominate the failure landscape.
By Marisa Ferrara Boston, Glen Hanson, Effi Georgala, JD Hudgens, Heather Frase
arXiv:2606. 01365v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems spend computation through model tokens, tool calls, retries, and code execution before producing an answer.
By Xianyou Li, Weiran Yan, Yichao Wu, Penghao Liang, Mengwei Yuan, Jianan Liu, Jing Yang
arXiv:2608. 02464v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents fail mid-episode -- they loop, cascade tool errors, drift off goal, fabricate results, or silently absorb corrupted content -- and the standard remedy, judging every step with a second LLM, costs more than the agent itself.
By Sunny Dubey
arXiv:2606. 11267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Data leakage -- contamination of a model with information unavailable at baseline -- is the dominant reproducibility failure in machine-learning-based science, yet detection tools require training code, external data, or domain expertise.
By Laurence A. Jacobs
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
By Oleg Solozobov