arXiv Computer Vision
Environmental Injection Attacks against GUI Agents in Realistic Dynamic Environments
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BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents
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Where You Inject Matters: The Trust Region Effect in LLM Agents
The paper investigates how the location of malicious instructions—known as indirect prompt injections—affects the vulnerability of large language model agents. By testing agents across tool use, coding, and daily workflow scenarios, the authors discover a "trust region effect," where agents are more likely to follow unsafe instructions placed in certain environmental surfaces, such as README files, than in others. They also develop learning-based attackers that optimize both injection content and placement, demonstrating that both factors significantly influence attack success.