arXiv AI By Hao Sui, Simeng Qin, Jie Liao, Xiaojun Jia, Bing Chen, Yang Liu

ElasticBack: Stealthy Conditional Backdoor in LLM-Agent Skills via Coupled Trigger-Rule Optimization

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arXiv:2608. 09577v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent skills, bundles of instructions and resources that an LLM agent loads on demand, form an emerging supply chain where a single poisoned skill can persistently compromise every agent that installs it.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
2d ago

Backdoor Containment via Expert Quarantine and Shutdown in LLMs

The paper introduces Quarantined Expert Shutdown (QES), a new backdoor containment strategy for large language models. QES allows backdoor learning to occur during training but routes it into a designated, quarantined expert that can be disabled at deployment. The method achieves significant reductions in attack success rates while largely preserving model utility.

By Jianwei Li, Min-Seon Kim, Jung-Eun Kim
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov