arXiv AI By Puyu Zeng, Simeng Qin, Jingzhi Li, Ju Jia, Zheli Liu, Xiaojun Jia

ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scanners

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arXiv:2608. 09732v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based agent systems.

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arXiv AI
5d ago

Stealth Apart, Harm Together: Skill Cascading Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems

The paper introduces skill cascading attacks, where a malicious goal is spread across multiple seemingly benign skills, causing harmful outcomes when combined. It presents SkillCascade, an automated red‑teaming framework, and releases SkillCascade‑Bench, a benchmark of 213 validated cascading test cases across various agent systems and domains. Experiments show that these cascaded interactions reliably induce harmful behaviors while evading existing per‑skill scanners and runtime monitors, revealing a gap between component‑level integrity and system‑level safety.

By Zihao Zhu, Siwei Lyu, Adel Bibi, Baoyuan Wu
arXiv AI
Aug 18

CompoSkill: Compositional Skill Chain Attacks from Individually Scanner-Passing LLM Agent Skills

arXiv:2608. 16246v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents tackling Long Horizon Tasks depend on marketplace skills that are certified one at a time: a scanner returns a safety verdict for each skill and declares the ecosystem safe if every package passes.

By Mingxiao Liu, Zhoumian Jiang, Jianan Ma, Jian Zhang, Jialuo Chen, Xinhao Deng, Zhen Wang
arXiv AI
2d ago

Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents

The paper introduces a new skill poisoning technique for large language model agents that decouples the pretext (rationale) from the actuation (operation). By separating these two risk‑realization factors, the authors create coordinated pretext‑actuation skill pairs that allow malicious actions to remain hidden within legitimate agent behavior. An automated framework is presented to discover execution dependencies, synthesize these skill pairs, and refine them through closed‑loop feedback, achieving high attack success in both single‑session and persistent scenarios.

By Wenxin Wu, Lingyong Yan, Lei Sha, Shuaiqiang Wang, Jiashu Zhao