arXiv:2512. 04008v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Training with differential privacy (DP) guarantees dataset members that they cannot be identified by users of the released model.
Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2505. 22703v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Many problems in trustworthy ML can be expressed as constraints on prediction rates across subpopulations, including group fairness constraints (demographic parity, equalized odds, etc.
arXiv:2608.28934v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) has traditionally been used to provide theoretical upper bounds on an algorithm's stability to changing its training data. In...
arXiv:2609.39629v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) in machine learning is typically achieved by adding noise to model parameters (private learning) or to model outputs (private...
arXiv:2407. 08233v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Current differentially private learning paradigms face a severe utility bottleneck: DP-SGD degrades performance through noise accumulation over training steps, while aggregation-based approaches such as PATE suffer from data inefficiency due to disjoint data partitioning.
arXiv:2407. 04884v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The hidden state threat model of differential privacy (DP) assumes that the adversary has access only to the final trained machine learning (ML) model, without seeing intermediate states during training.
The paper investigates black-box privacy auditing for differentially private learning algorithms, focusing on DP‑SGD. It introduces a method that optimizes the auditor’s canary set using metagradient descent, improving empirical lower bounds on privacy parameters compared to prior canary designs. The approach is shown to be DP‑SGD agnostic and efficient, with optimized canaries for small models remaining effective for larger DP‑SGD models.