arXiv:2608. 09867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage.
By Alexander Panfilov, David Schmotz, Ilia Shumailov, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Joachim Schaeffer, Ameya Prabhu, Jonas Geiping, Maksym Andriushchenko
arXiv:2607. 01313v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In practice, most commercial LLM providers do not publicly release details of underlying LLM architectures.
By Christopher Ellis, Shreyas Chaudhari, Mei-Yu Wang, Leighton Barnes, Giulia Fanti, Jos\'e M. F. Moura
arXiv:2506. 07031v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Emerging Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) consistently excel in mathematical and reasoning tasks, showcasing remarkable capabilities.
By Jingyuan Ma, Rui Li, Zheng Li, Junfeng Liu, Heming Xia, Lei Sha, Zhifang Sui
arXiv:2602. 14095v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning.
By Artem Karpov
arXiv:2606. 16244v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models routinely generate code with exploitable security flaws.
By Xiaoyun Xu, Lichao Wu, Jona te Lintelo, Siyu Zhang, Stjepan Picek
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov