arXiv:2607. 01313v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In practice, most commercial LLM providers do not publicly release details of underlying LLM architectures.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2607. 20723v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This work presents LeakyLMs, a set of attacks that leak proprietary model, architecture, and deployment information from production language models.
arXiv:2608. 16391v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models become increasingly widespread, third-party providers that deploy open-weight models have become an important part of the ecosystem.
arXiv:2607. 10252v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consumed through opaque serving chains - API aggregators, resellers, and inference providers - in which the client has no technical means to confirm that the model answering is the model advertised, and recent audits show that a substantial fraction of commercial endpoints deviate from the vendor's reference weights.
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
arXiv:2606. 28649v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present RIPA, the first systematic multi-channel empirical study of prompt injection attacks delivered through the sensory pipeline of a ROS 2-based LLM-controlled robotic system.
arXiv:2608. 01388v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Runtime safety monitors based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and finite automata (FSA) are increasingly deployed to intercept unsafe tool-call sequences in LLM agents.