arXiv:2607. 07314v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself.
By Chongkai Li, Bang Zhang, Wenjian Luo
The paper introduces Fed-ADR, a coordinated attack framework where a malicious orchestrator server directs heterogeneous adversarial clients to adapt their gradient updates in real time, thereby evading existing federated learning defenses and drastically reducing global model accuracy. It also presents a lightweight detection mechanism that estimates true client gradients from historical data to spot coordinated attacks, and an in-situ recovery method that restores model performance without restarting training. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion‑MNIST, and CIFAR‑10 show the attack can drop accuracy from over 90% to below 10%, while the defense can recover accuracy to above 90% within a few rounds at a computational cost at least 20× lower than retraining from scratch.
By Mohamed Shaaban, Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy
arXiv:2509. 11974v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training among clients without centralising data, making it a widely adopted privacy-enhancing technology (PET).
By Soumia Zohra El Mestari, Maciej Krzysztof Zuziak, Gabriele Lenzini
arXiv:2601. 07177v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) addresses privacy and data-silo issues in the training of large language models (LLMs).
By Mingxiang Tao, Yu Tian, Wenxuan Tu, Yue Yang, Xue Yang, Xiangyan Tang
arXiv:2608. 04073v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personalized Federated Learning (PFL) has emerged as a promising solution for intrusion detection in heterogeneous IoT environments, as it can improve local adaptation under highly Non-Independent and Identically Distributed (non-IID) data distributions.
By An Khanh Bui, Cong Thanh Nguyen, Hoang-Anh Pham, Hoang Thai Dinh, Diep N. Nguyen
Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself. Recently, centralized Taking Away Training Data (TATD) attacks have shown that malicious training could abuse the memorization capacity of deep models to store and later recover training data.